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THE DOXING DILEMMA:  SEEKING A REMEDY 
FOR THE MALICIOUS PUBLICATION 
OF PERSONAL INFORMATION 
Julia M. MacAllister* 
 
In recent years, malevolent actors have seized upon a new tool to harass, 
silence, threaten, and injure people online:  doxing—the malicious 
publication of personal identifying information like a home address.  
Although doxing is an online tool, it causes concrete and serious harm to 
victims by moving harassment from the Internet to the physical world.  
Congress and state legislatures have begun to address different forms of 
cyberharassment.  However, no effective and consistent legal remedy for 
doxing currently exists.  This Note examines and critiques current federal 
and state schemes, and it ultimately proposes that lower federal courts 
should adopt a new intent standard to make the federal Interstate 
Communications Statute more applicable to doxing and that states can and 
should criminalize malicious doxing. 
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INTRODUCTION 
On the night of October 10, 2014, a Twitter user named “Death to 
Brianna” began to tweet rape and death threats targeted at Brianna Wu, 
head of development at independent game studio Giant Spacekat.1  The 
user’s picture, appearing next to each tweet, was a photo of Wu and her 
husband.2  The user described in graphic detail how he planned to rape, 
murder, and mutilate Wu, kill her children, and torture her husband 
imminently.3  Within four minutes of the harassment starting, the user 
 
 1. Caitlin Dewey, In the Battle of Internet Mobs vs. the Law, the Internet Mobs Have 
Won, WASH. POST (Feb. 17, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-
intersect/wp/2016/02/17/in-the-battle-of-internet-mobs-vs-the-law-the-internet-mobs-have-
won [https://perma.cc/J7N9-8LF5]. 
 2. Brianna Wu (@Spacekatgal), TWITTER (Oct. 10, 2014, 8:57 PM), 
https://twitter.com/Spacekatgal/status/520739878993420290/ [perma.cc/VK5M-SLPP]. 
 3. Id. 
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wrote:  “Guess what bitch?  I now know where you live.  You and Frank 
live at [home address redacted].”4 
Fearing for her life, Wu fled her home in the middle of the night with her 
family.5  Her harassers have not been charged.6  Wu, like many other 
people who use the Internet daily,7 had been doxed.8  Doxing is a form of 
cyberharassment9 involving the public release of personal information that 
can be used to identify or locate an individual, such as a home address, 
email address, phone number, social security number, and employer or 
school contact information.10 
The injuries suffered by victims of cyberharassment are well 
documented:  “post-traumatic stress disorder, depression, and serious 
emotional distress[,] . . . ‘changes in sleeping and eating patterns, 
nightmares, hyper-vigilance, anxiety, helplessness, fear for safety, and 
shock and disbelief.’”11  Thus, the law creates penalties for some types of 
cyberharassment such as threats transmitted over state lines,12 stalking,13 
and swatting14 (a wrong-premises SWAT raid of an innocent person’s 
home15).  However, this Note argues that the current statutory and common 
 
 4. Id. 
 5. Id. 
 6. Anna Merlan, The Cops Don’t Care About Violent Online Threats.  What Do We Do 
Now?, JEZEBEL (Jan. 29, 2015, 3:10 PM), http://jezebel.com/the-cops-dont-care-about-
violent-online-threats-what-d-1682577343 [https://perma.cc/VU56-R7TE]. 
 7. See Abby Ohlheiser, The Leslie Jones Hack Used All the Scariest Tactics of Internet 
Warfare at Once, WASH. POST (Aug. 26, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-
intersect/wp/2016/08/26/the-leslie-jones-hack-used-all-the-scariest-tactics-of-internet-
warfare-at-once (describing the doxing and racist harassment that Leslie Jones faced after 
appearing in the film Ghostbusters) [https://perma.cc/24WR-2WMX]; Adi Robertson, Trolls 
Drive Anita Sarkeesian out of Her House to Prove Misogyny Doesn’t Exist, VERGE (Aug. 27, 
2014, 3:41 PM), http://www.theverge.com/2014/8/27/6075179/anita-sarkeesian-says-she-
was-driven-out-of-house-by-threats (reporting that a feminist critic and her parents were 
doxed after she posted videos “aggregating and analyzing games that portray women as 
damsels in distress, ornamental eye candy, incidental victims, and other archetypes that tend 
to be written in service of and subordinate to male players and characters”) [perma.cc/YD76-
4DLY]. 
 8. Dewey, supra note 1. 
 9. Cyberharassment enables actors “to harass their victims on a scale never before 
possible,” with their conduct having both an “immediate effect” and “global dissemination.” 
John B. Major, Cyberstalking, Twitter, and the Captive Audience:  A First Amendment 
Analysis of 18 U.S.C. § 2261A(2), 86 S. CAL. L. REV. 117, 126 (2012). 
 10. See Mary Anne Franks, Professor, Univ. of Miami Sch. of Law, Remarks at the 
American Bar Association Program on Doxing, Swatting, Trolls, and SJWs:  Harassment 
and Gender Discrimination on Social Media Platforms (Nov. 8, 2016) (on file with the 
Fordham Law Review). 
 11. Major, supra note 9, at 126 (quoting Nicolle Parsons-Pollard & Laura J. Moriarty, 
Cyberstalking—What’s the Big Deal?, in CONTROVERSIES IN VICTIMOLOGY 103, 108 (Laura 
J. Moriarty ed., 2d ed. 2008)). 
 12. See 18 U.S.C. § 875(c) (2012). 
 13. See id. § 2261A. 
 14. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 148.3 (West 2014) (criminalizing the act of making 
fraudulent emergency calls to cause SWAT raids of an innocent person’s home). 
 15. See Rex M. Shannon III, Comment, Nightmare on Your Street:  Moving Towards 
Justice for Innocent Victims of Wrong-Premises SWAT Raids, 77 MISS. L.J. 669, 670–72 
(2007). 
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law regime fails to provide a reliable remedy for doxing victims.16  
Specifically, the law does not address situations in which an actor uses 
doxing for purely malicious purposes, such as revenge, harassment, or 
stalking, as opposed to political purposes or internal regulation. 
Of course, some or all of the dispersed information might already be 
public information.17  However, the semipublic nature of this information 
should not provide blanket immunity for a malicious actor who wields an 
individual’s personal information as a tool to harass, threaten, intimidate, 
and injure that person. 
In addition, the complex and intangible nature of doxing should not act as 
an excuse for lack of regulation, because “[t]oday, with smartphones and 
endless social media platforms, there is no difference between online and 
offline life.  It is all just life.”18  In fact, when an actor doxes an 
individual—as opposed to harassing that individual in person—the harms 
caused by that harassment are amplified due to the conduct’s “permanent 
quality that real world conduct lacks.”19  Moreover, doxing can incite 
individuals other than the actor to commit or threaten real-world violence 
because it entails the distribution of a subject’s personal information to a 
broad and unknowable audience.20  Indeed, experts warn that “[a]s people 
realize what an effective attack [doxing] can be, and how an individual can 
use the tactic to do considerable damage, . . . we’re going to see a lot more 
of it.”21  Accordingly, a remedy for doxing is needed. 
This Note examines the vast injuries doxing causes when used for purely 
malicious reasons and assesses whether an appropriate and successful legal 
remedy for this form of doxing can exist.  Part I defines doxing, narrows the 
scope of this Note to “punching down” doxing, and examines the 
underlying doctrines of privacy and First Amendment law.  Next, Part II 
analyzes the strengths and weaknesses of three relevant federal laws—the 
 
 16. See DANIELLE KEATS CITRON, HATE CRIMES IN CYBERSPACE 19 (2014) (“Victims are 
told not to expect any help:  ‘This is the INTERNET folks. . . .  There are no laws here, at 
least not clearly defined ones.’” (alteration in original)). But see, e.g., H.B. 225, 61st Leg., 
Gen. Sess. (Utah 2016) (cybercrime statute amendments). 
 17. See Franks, supra note 10. 
 18. See Marissa Lang, Revenge Porn Is Target of Intimate Privacy Protection Act, S.F. 
CHRON. (Sept. 30, 2016, 8:22 PM), http://www.sfchronicle.com/business/article/Intimate-
Privacy-Protection-Act-to-take-on-9517671.php (quoting the author of revenge porn 
legislation Representative Jackie Speier) [https://perma.cc/JCG5-D7YK]. 
 19. Major, supra note 9, at 126. 
 20. See, e.g., Jason Slotkin, “Pizzagate” Suspect Planned “Possibly” Violent Raid, 
Investigators Say, NPR (Dec. 13, 2016, 3:22 PM), http://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-
way/2016/12/13/505424283/pizzagate-suspect-faces-federal-charge (describing a man who, 
motivated by a baseless Internet rumor, went to a Washington, D.C., restaurant and fired an 
assault rifle) [https://perma.cc/TZS2-24HN]. See generally Matthew James Enzweiler, 
Swatting Political Discourse:  A Domestic Terrorism Threat, 90 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 2001, 
2007 (2015) (discussing prank 911 calls resulting in heavily armed SWAT team responses to 
subjects’ homes, and noting that “the risk of injury or death is beyond question in these 
instances”). 
 21. Bruce Schneier, The Rise of Political Doxing, SCHNEIER ON SECURITY (Nov. 2, 2015, 
6:47 AM), https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2015/11/the_rise_of_pol.html [https:// 
perma.cc/4Y6G-R6U5]. 
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Communications Decency Act, the Interstate Communications Statute, and 
the Interstate Stalking Statute—and a proposed bill.  Part II also assesses 
the strengths and weaknesses of state criminal and common law approaches 
to cyberharassment and discusses the efficacy of these approaches to 
doxing.  Then, Part III offers a blended solution and proposes that (1) 
federal courts should adopt the recklessness standard left open by the U.S. 
Supreme Court in Elonis v. United States22 and (2) states can and should 
create or amend criminal laws addressing doxing because the doxing of a 
subject’s home address is a true threat and thus can be regulated under the 
true threat exception to the First Amendment. 
I.  DROPPING DOX:  UNDERSTANDING THE PROBLEM 
AND ITS UNDERLYING DOCTRINES 
Part I.A defines doxing and distinguishes it from other types of 
cyberharassment, and Part I.B discusses the three ways actors could use 
doxing as a tool for harassment.  Specifically, Part I.B narrows the focus of 
this Note to instances in which actors use doxing for purely malicious 
reasons, as opposed to political purposes or internal regulation.  Finally, 
Part I.C introduces two rights that are directly affected by doxing:  the right 
to privacy and the First Amendment’s right to freedom of speech. 
A.  Doxing Defined 
While the term’s origin is not certain, “doxing” likely dates back to 2001 
and the hacker group known as Anonymous.23  “‘Dox’ is a longstanding 
shortening of ‘documents’ or ‘to document,’ especially in technology 
industries.”24  Scholars and journalists define “doxing” in various ways 
because it is not a defined legal term.25  In an effort to apply a more 
 
 22. 135 S. Ct. 2001 (2015). 
 23. Bruce Schneier, Doxing as an Attack, SCHNEIER ON SECURITY (Jan. 2, 2015, 
7:21 AM), https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2015/01/doxing_as_an_at.html [https:// 
perma.cc/VL4R-5VC2]. 
 24. Grant Barrett, Opinion, Words of 2012, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 22, 2012), 
https://nyti.ms/2kBAuDs [https://perma.cc/4ED5-VVGV]. 
 25. For example, Sarah Jeong defines doxing as “the publication of a physical residential 
address, or information protected by law.” Sarah Jeong, Stop Diluting the Definition of 
“Dox,” SARAHJEONG DOT NET (July 8, 2015), https://sarahjeong.net/2015/07/08/stop-
diluting-the-definition-of-dox/ [https://perma.cc/6Y3P-AS4W].  Gabriella Coleman, 
however, does not limit her definition of doxing to legally protected information; rather, she 
defines doxing as “the leaking of private information—such as Social Security numbers, 
home addresses, or personal photos.” GABRIELLA COLEMAN, HACKER, HOAXER, 
WHISTLEBLOWER, SPY 7 (2015).  Similarly, Danielle Keats Citron notes that doxing can 
occur when “[t]rolls post individuals’ phone numbers, addresses, and social security 
numbers.” CITRON, supra note 16, at 53.  “Trolls” refers to persons who post deliberately 
erroneous or antagonistic messages to a newsgroup or similar forum with the intention of 
eliciting a hostile or corrective response. COLEMAN, supra, at 32 (defining trolls as “agents 
of cultural digestion [who] scavenge the landscape, re-purpose the most offensive material, 
then shove the resulting monstrosities into the faces of an unsuspecting populace”).  Further, 
Bruce Schneier defines doxing as “the practice of publishing personal information about 
people without their consent.” Schneier, supra note 23. 
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inclusive definition of doxing, this Note adopts Professor Mary Anne 
Frank’s definition: 
The public release of an individual’s private, sensitive, personal 
information, such as: 
 •  Home address, email address, phone number 
 •  Social security number 
 •  Employer and employer contact info 
 •  Family member’s contact info 
 •  Photos of victim’s children and the school they attend.26 
This definition of doxing concerns publicly available information that 
would not necessarily require a hack to access.27  In addition, this Note 
adopts the term “actor” to describe the person who doxes and the term 
“subject” to describe the person who is doxed. 
Doxing rarely occurs in isolation.28  Rather, doxing is often used as a tool 
by multiple actors within a greater campaign to harass one subject.29  
Actors dox in conjunction with other forms of harassment, such as revenge 
porn30 and swatting.31  However, these other forms of cyberharassment are 
distinguishable from doxing because they involve conduct rooted in older 
areas of law such as copyright32 and manipulation of technology integrated 
in telecommunications channels.33  Statutes concerning cyberharassment 
often draw directly from original offline stalking and harassment laws.34  
 
 26. Franks, supra note 10. 
 27. The Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (CFAA) criminalizes the misuse of a computer 
or the use of a computer in excess of a user’s authorization. 18 U.S.C. § 1030 (2012).  This 
statute could be used to prosecute actors who dox private information acquired by hacking. 
See, e.g., Sarah A. Constant, The Computer Fraud and Abuse Act:  A Prosecutor’s Dream 
and a Hacker’s Worst Nightmare—The Case Against Aaron Swartz and the Need to Reform 
the CFAA, 16 TUL. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 231, 241 (2013) (discussing the case against a 
defendant who hacked JSTOR, an academic articles subscription service, and made articles 
available for free online).  Doxing cases that do not involve a hack are not prosecutable 
under this statute. 
 28. See COLEMAN, supra note 25, at 44. 
 29. See id.  Coleman describes Anonymous’s 2010 harassment of Jessi Slaughter, a 
preteen video blogger.  This harassment included “publish[ing] her phone number, address, 
and Twitter username, inundating her with hateful emails and threatening prank calls, 
circulating photoshopped images of her and satiric remixes of her videos.” Id.  She 
ultimately became an online “object of ridicule,” forever associated with the term 
“lulzcow . . . whore.” Id.; see also Jessi Slaughter, URBAN DICTIONARY (July 15, 2010), 
http://www.urbandictionary.com/define.php?term=Jessi+Slaughter&defid=5099483 
[https://perma.cc/3JAZ-56HU]. 
 30. See Barnes v. Yahoo!, Inc., 570 F.3d 1096, 1098–99 (9th Cir. 2009) (describing the 
doxing of Cecilia Barnes in conjunction with the publication of pornographic photos taken 
without her consent). 
 31. See Kevin Poulsen, Blind Hacker Sentenced to 11 Years in Prison, WIRED (June 29, 
2009, 7:28 PM), https://www.wired.com/2009/06/blind_hacker/ (discussing Matthew 
Weigman’s confession to making “hundreds of false calls to police that sent armed SWAT 
teams bursting into the homes of [his] enemies”) [https://perma.cc/QRC7-28GV]. 
 32. Layla Goldnick, Coddling the Internet:  How the CDA Exacerbates the Proliferation 
of Revenge Porn and Prevents a Meaningful Remedy for Its Victims, 21 CARDOZO J.L. & 
GENDER 583, 610 (2015). 
 33. Enzweiler, supra note 20, at 2004. 
 34. Nancy Leong & Joanne Morando, Communication in Cyberspace, 94 N.C. L. REV. 
105, 114–15 (2015). 
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Many harassment laws were drafted in the 1990s when the Internet’s usage 
was dramatically different from today.35  In 1997, 18 percent of Americans 
used the Internet; today, 87 percent do.36  Accordingly, the scale of harm 
doxing causes today is much greater than when legislatures drafted many 
applicable statutes. 
In addition, doxing concerns the release of information that could 
otherwise be publicly available, unlike revenge porn and swatting.37  By 
doxing a subject’s home address or other information that can be used to 
locate a subject, an actor moves the harassment from the Internet into the 
physical world, putting the subject in actual physical danger.  In addition, 
doxing makes personal information more accessible to the entire Internet, 
increasing the harassment by putting the subject at risk of injury or violence 
from a large audience in a way that other forms of harassment do not.38  
Nonetheless, in many cases, other forms of harassment are redressable, but 
there is no consistent legal remedy for doxing.39 
B.  Doxing Actors and Their Intent; 
Doxing Subjects and Their Injuries 
Doxing is a tool, and the intent behind its use determines the proper 
approach for analyzing it.  For the purpose of seeking a remedy, this Note 
recognizes three categories of doxing determined by the actor’s intent:  (1) 
punching down doxing (i.e., doxing for purely malicious purposes); (2) 
doxing for political purposes; and (3) the use of doxing by members of 
anonymous online communities as a tool for internal regulation (i.e., 
“unmasking”).  Understanding the different actors who use doxing, the 
subjects who suffer the consequences of the publication of their personal 
information, and the varying motivations underpinning the use of doxing 
helps to narrow the search for an effective remedy. 
1.  Punching Down:  Doxing “for the Lulz,” or Worse 
When an actor publishes a subject’s personal information for purely 
malicious reasons, such as revenge, harassment, stalking, or “for the lulz” 
(meaning “laughter at the expense or the misfortune of others”40), the actor 
is engaging in punching down doxing.  The public, viral, and instant nature 
 
 35. See id. 
 36. Monica Anderson & Andrew Perrin, 13% of Americans Don’t Use the Internet.  
Who Are They?, PEW RES. CTR. (Sept. 7, 2016), http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-
tank/2016/09/07/some-americans-dont-use-the-internet-who-are-they/ [https://perma.cc/WP 
5B-LLWW]. 
 37. See supra note 25 and accompanying text. 
 38. Schneier, supra note 21. 
 39. See, e.g., Enzweiler, supra note 20, at 2001; Patricia R. Recupero, New 
Technologies, New Problems, New Laws, 44 J. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 322, 325 
(2016). 
 40. COLEMAN, supra note 25, at 31.  “The lulz show how easily and casually trolls can 
upend our sense of security by invading private spaces and exposing confidential 
information. . . .  [A]ny information thought to be personal, secure, or sacred is a prime 
target for sharing or defilement . . . .” Id. at 32–33. 
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of the Internet makes doxing an effective tool for harassing individuals for 
purely malicious purposes; it allows the actor to injure the subject on a 
much larger scale than in-person harassment.  However, most people do not 
see doxing as a serious problem, because names and phone numbers are 
available in public phone directories.41  Even so, huge differences in scale 
and accessibility exist between information “buried in small font in a dense 
book of which only a few thousand copies exist in a relatively small 
geographic location” and information released online that anyone anywhere 
in the world can access.42 
For example, Cecilia Barnes’s ex-boyfriend engaged in punching down 
doxing, among other forms of cyberharassment, against Barnes after she 
ended their long-term relationship.43  He created a Yahoo! profile using her 
name that included sexual solicitations and nude photographs taken without 
her knowledge or permission.44  In terms of doxing, Barnes’s ex-boyfriend 
posted her personal and work telephone numbers, her home address, and 
her email address.45  He solicited sex in Yahoo! chat rooms, impersonating 
her “and then directing the attention of male chat room goers to the indecent 
profiles he had posted of her.”46  Because her ex-boyfriend had doxed her 
by posting her personal information, Barnes began receiving harassing 
emails and phone calls, and random men attempted “to make personal visits 
to her [home] with the false expectation that Barnes would act upon the 
online sexual advances propagated by her ex-boyfriend.”47 
Barnes sued Yahoo! for negligently failing to remove the unauthorized 
profile after she tried to have the company take down the offensive 
material.48  However, because the Communications Decency Act shields 
Internet service providers from liability, the case was dismissed.49 
Revenge porn and other sexual material is offensive, humiliating, and can 
cause reputational damage.  Further, the actual dox of Barnes’s name and 
contact information is harassment that put her in physical danger and 
provoked fear for her safety.  Barnes’s ex-boyfriend had posted her personal 
contact information for the “specific purpose of committing a ‘dangerous, 
cruel, and highly indecent’ attempt at revenge,” and such conduct ultimately 
resulted in significant harm to Barnes.50  And yet, Barnes lacked any 
remedy for such conduct because the law fails to criminalize punching 
down doxing. 
 
 41. Katherine Cross, “Things Have Happened in the Past Week”:  On Doxing, Swatting, 
and 8Chan, FEMINISTING (Jan. 16, 2015), http://feministing.com/2015/01/16/things-have-
happened-in-the-past-week-on-doxing-swatting-and-8chan/ [https://perma.cc/VWP5-TC7L]. 
 42. Id. 
 43. See Barnes v. Yahoo!, Inc., 570 F.3d 1096, 1098 (9th Cir. 2009). 
 44. Id. 
 45. Kimberly Quon, Implementing a Standard of Care to Provide Protection from a 
Lawless Internet, 31 WHITTIER L. REV. 589, 592 (2010). 
 46. Id. 
 47. Id. 
 48. Barnes, 570 F.3d at 1099. 
 49. Id. at 1105–06. 
 50. Quon, supra note 45, at 589. 
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Another example of punching down doxing is the “#gamergate” 
campaign of harassment (“Gamergate”) that targeted women with threats of 
death and rape, general abuse, and the release of names, cell phone 
numbers, addresses, usernames, and parental information.51  The actors 
worked together under the adopted moniker “Gamergate” and executed a 
“weekslong campaign to discredit or intimidate outspoken critics of the 
male-dominated gaming industry and its culture.”52  The subjects of 
Gamergate harassment, like Brianna Wu,53 endured a constant barrage of 
harassment that affected their ability to work, socialize, and sleep.54  Writer 
and developer Zoe Quinn fled her home after people online made rape and 
death threats toward her and bragged about putting dead animals through 
her mailbox.55  Feminist cultural critic Anita Sarkeesian canceled a talk at 
Utah State University after the university administration received an email 
that a shooting massacre would be carried out at the event.56  One important 
factor unites the stories of Barnes, Wu, Quinn, and Sarkeesian:  the actors 
doxed them with the intent to intimidate, harass, silence, and threaten them.  
These stories exemplify punching down doxing, and this Note seeks legal 
relief for these subjects.57 
 
 51. A_Man_in_Black, A #gamergate Harassment Sampler, STORIFY, 
https://storify.com/a_man_in_black/gamergate-harassment (last visited Mar. 25, 2017) 
[https://perma.cc/Y5J8-LKF7]. 
 52. Nick Wingfield, Feminist Critics of Video Games Facing Threats in “Gamergate” 
Campaign, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 15, 2014), http://nyti.ms/1quzTvM [https://perma.cc/93GA-
CWSA]. 
 53. See supra notes 1–10 and accompanying text.  The tweets targeting Wu read:  (1) 
“Guess what bitch?  I now know where you live.  You and Frank live at [home address 
redacted]”;  (2) “I’ve got a K-Bar [knife used by U.S. Marines] and I’m coming to your 
house so I can shove it up your ugly feminist cunt”; (3) “I’m going to rape your filthy ass 
until you bleed, then choke you to death with your husband’s tiny Asian penis”; (4) “How’s 
that for terrifying you stuck up cunt?  I’m sick of you fucking feminist asshats”; (5) “Your 
mutilated corpse will be on the front page of Jezebel tomorrow and there isn’t jack shit you 
can do about it”; (6) “If you have any kids, they’re going to die too.  I don’t give a fuck.  
They’ll grow up to be feminists anyway”; (7) “I hope you enjoy your last moments alive on 
this earth.  You did nothing worthwhile with your life”; and (8) “You just made a shitty 
game nobody liked.  That’s it.  Nobody [will care] when you die.” Wu, supra note 2. 
 54. A_Man_in_Black, supra note 51. 
 55. Keith Stuart, Zoe Quinn:  “All Gamergate Has Done Is Ruin People’s Lives,” 
GUARDIAN (Dec. 3, 2014, 9:00 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2014/ 
dec/03/zoe-quinn-gamergate-interview [https://perma.cc/GF65-RXL6]. 
 56. Wingfield, supra note 52. 
 57. Cyberharassment disproportionately affects women and minority populations. See 
CITRON, supra note 16, at 13 (“Of the 3,393 individuals reporting cyber harassment to 
[advocacy group Working to Halt Online Abuse] from 2000 to 2011, 72.5 percent were 
female.”); see also id. at 11 (arguing that young people, people of color, and lesbian, gay, 
bisexual, transgender, and queer (LGBTQ) people are more likely to experience severe 
emotional distress from cyberharassment).  Statistics from suicide prevention organizations 
indicate that suicide rates by victims of online harassment are higher for minority 
populations. Id. (information on suicide statistics); id. at 80 (domestic violence history); id. 
at 102 (stalking). 
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2.  Doxing for Political Purposes 
This Note focuses on instances in which doxing is used for purely 
malicious purposes, as discussed in Part I.B.1; however, doxing is also used 
for political purposes.  That is, some actors use doxing as a tool to increase 
transparency, expose what they perceive as injustice, or bring to light 
newsworthy information in the public interest.  The subjects of this 
category of doxing might include multinational corporations, the U.S. 
military, Donald Trump, or racist police officers. 
For example, in early 2010, Chelsea Manning doxed the U.S. military by 
releasing hundreds of thousands of sensitive military and diplomatic 
documents to WikiLeaks.58  Manning dropped the dox because she “felt 
that the Iraq and Afghanistan ‘war diaries’ . . . were vital to the public’s 
understanding of the two interconnected counter-insurgency conflicts.”59  
The dox “provide[d] ‘visual evidence of the gross abuse of state and 
military power.’”60  Thus, Manning doxed for political purposes—rather 
than for purely malicious reasons. 
Another well-known instance of doxing for political purposes occurred 
when the New York Times published an excerpt from then-presidential 
candidate Donald Trump’s 1995 tax returns to show that “he had taken a 
huge [financial] loss in 1995 that could have allowed him to avoid paying 
federal income taxes for nearly two decades.”61  The New York Times 
dropped the dox for political purposes, stating that it was in the public 
interest because Trump “ha[d] broken with decades-long tradition and 
refused to make his returns public” during a presidential campaign.62 
In addition, chapters of the Black Lives Matter network used doxing to 
expose police officers who purportedly used police brutality or racist 
tactics.63  In these cases, the actors doxed to help protect other activists and 
 
 58. Chelsea E. Manning, The Years Since I Was Jailed for Releasing the “War Diaries” 
Have Been a Rollercoaster, GUARDIAN (May 27, 2015, 10:43 AM), https:// 
www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2015/may/27/anniversary-chelsea-manning-arrest-
war-diaries [https://perma.cc/79ZZ-3JY4]. 
 59. Id.  Manning was convicted of the leak in 2010, and President Barack Obama 
commuted her sentence in January 2017. Charlie Savage, Chelsea Manning to Be Released 
Early as Obama Commutes Sentence, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 17, 2017), https://nyti.ms/2k1jene 
[https://perma.cc/A6LC-4ZVT]. 
 60. COLEMAN, supra note 25, at 83 (quoting Christian Christensen, Collateral Murder 
and the After-Life of Activist Imagery, MEDIUM (Apr. 14, 2014), https://medium.com/ 
@ChrChristensen/collateral-murder-and-the-after-life-of-activist-imagery-3fc2accd82bb#.70 
lzgt8mt [https://perma.cc/M6ZJ-ZLTU]. 
 61. Susanne Craig, The Time I Found Donald Trump’s Tax Records in My Mailbox, 
N.Y. TIMES:  TIMES INSIDER (Oct. 2, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/10/03/insider/the-
time-i-found-donald-trumps-tax-records-in-my-mailbox.html [https://perma.cc/2RGQ-2P 
SE]. 
 62. Id. 
 63. See J. Patrick Coolican, Minneapolis City Council Member Alondra Cano Under 
Fire for Posting Phone Numbers, E-mail Addresses of Constituents, STAR TRIB. (Dec. 24, 
2015, 12:34 PM), http://www.startribune.com/minneapolis-city-council-member-alondra-
cano-under-fire-for-posting-phone-numbers-email-addresses-of-constituents/363470421/ 
[https://perma.cc/B3F6-LVLZ]. 
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draw attention to corruption and civil rights abuses within law 
enforcement.64 
The law has engaged in efforts to criminalize doxing when it is used for 
political purposes, but it has failed to criminalize doxing when used solely 
for malicious purposes (i.e., punching down doxing).  In fact, some of the 
strongest antidoxing regulations protect public figures, while private 
citizens like Brianna Wu are left without effective remedies.65  For 
example, Texas has taken legislative action to make it easier to prosecute 
people who dox police officers.66  In addition, federal law applies to doxing 
incidents that result in economic harm to businesses, such as Internet 
activist Aaron Swartz’s dox of academic articles from the subscription 
service JSTOR for the purpose of making academic information freely 
available.67 
The reason for such different protections under the law is confusing, 
especially because government transparency is an important principle that 
some scholars consider equal to individual privacy.68  Indeed, corporations, 
government entities, and public figures have a lesser privacy interest than 
individuals.69 
3.  Internal Regulation:  Unmasking Troublemakers 
Doxing is also used for “internal regulation” or “self-regulation.”70  
Hackers use this doxing category to expose (or “to unmask”) the identity of 
fellow hackers who, for one reason or another, have fallen out of favor with 
their peers.71 
For example, members of Anonymous (“Anons”), involved in a 
campaign against Scientology, doxed fellow Anon, darr, when she 
“attempt[ed] to push through an unpopular proposal” by “railroad[ing]” the 
rest of the group.72  In addition, hackers doxed LulzSec leader-turned-FBI-
informant Sabu in an attempt to reveal his identity to the authorities so that 
 
 64. Id. 
 65. See, e.g., TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 38.15(d)(1) (West 2015) (creating a rebuttable 
presumption that a person is interfering with a peace officer if she intentionally disseminates 
the home address, home telephone number, or social security number of the officer or a 
family member of the officer). 
 66. Id. 
 67. See John Schwartz, Internet Activist, a Creator of RSS, Is Dead at 26, Apparently a 
Suicide, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 12, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/01/13/technology/aaron-
swartz-internet-activist-dies-at-26.html (describing the life and death of tech pioneer Aaron 
Swartz, who faced thirty-five years in prison and $1 million in fines for violating federal law 
in an effort to make JSTOR articles freely accessible) [https://perma.cc/KZ52-H4TB]. 
 68. See Martin E. Halstuk et al., Tipping the Scales:  How the U.S. Supreme Court 
Eviscerated Freedom of Information in Favor of Privacy, in TRANSPARENCY 2.0:  DIGITAL 
DATA AND PRIVACY IN A WIRED WORLD 17, 19–20 (David Cuillier & Charles N. Davis eds., 
2014). 
 69. See generally Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46 (1988); N.Y. Times 
Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964); Quin S. Landon, The First Amendment and Speech-
Based Torts:  Recalibrating the Balance, 66 U. MIAMI L. REV. 157 (2011). 
 70. See COLEMAN, supra note 25, at 73. 
 71. See id. 
 72. Id. 
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he would be prosecuted.73  This type of doxing falls in a gray area between 
doxing for malicious purposes and doxing for political purposes.  While this 
Note’s search for a remedy focuses specifically on punching down doxing, 
unmasking helps to differentiate the kinds of intent that can underlie an 
actor’s use of doxing. 
C.  Doctrinal Background 
This section discusses two relevant doctrines underlying, influencing, 
and limiting the possible remedies for punching down doxing:  (1) the right 
to privacy and (2) the First Amendment right to freedom of speech. 
1.  Right to Privacy 
The act of doxing implicates, by necessity, the subject’s right to privacy.  
Privacy is treasured in the United States.  In his dissent in Olmstead v. 
United States,74 Justice Louis Brandeis noted that “the right to be let alone 
[is] the most comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by civilized 
[people].”75 
As technology changes, so do notions of privacy.  Historically, privacy 
cases have asserted two constitutional values:  “the individual interest in 
avoiding disclosure of personal matters” and “the interest in independence 
in making certain kinds of important decisions.”76  Thus, doxing is uniquely 
harmful to the right of privacy because “there is no frontier where [one] 
may go to get a new start. . . .  All of our important acts, our setbacks, the 
accusations made against us go into data banks and are instantly 
retrievable.”77  Today, our data move about ceaselessly, so “the right to 
control the way others use the information concerning us” increases in 
importance as prevailing historical notions of privacy evolve.78 
However, the right to privacy is not absolute and often runs against 
freedom of speech and freedom of information.79  This conflict comes into 
play when actors dox publicly available information such as home 
addresses.  The interaction of privacy and access to information is not 
 
 73. Derek Mead, Sabu Has Been an FBI Informant for Months, MOTHERBOARD BLOG 
(Mar. 6, 2012, 10:26 AM), http://motherboard.vice.com/read/months-before-his-arrest-sabu-
was-railing-against-doxing-while-snitching-to-the-feds (“Doxing, in the world of modern 
hacking, is more or less a guaranteed jail sentence.”) [https://perma.cc/547Y-3BFG]. Sabu’s 
cooperation resulted in the prosecution of several other Anons. See COLEMAN, supra note 25, 
at 391. 
 74. 277 U.S. 438 (1928). 
 75. Id. at 478 (Brandeis, J., dissenting). 
 76. U.S. Dep’t of Justice v. Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press, 489 U.S. 749, 
762 (1989) (quoting Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 598–600 (1977)). 
 77. Sampson v. Murray, 415 U.S. 61, 96 (1974).  Although he was discussing computer 
data storage more generally, Justice William H. Rehnquist’s words ring true when applied to 
the Internet. See id. 
 78. Norberto Nuno Gomes de Andrade, The Right to Privacy and the Right to Identity in 
the Age of Ubiquitous Computing, in PERSONAL DATA PRIVACY AND PROTECTION IN A 
SURVEILLANCE ERA:  TECHNOLOGIES AND PRACTICES 19, 22–23 (Christina Akrivopoulou & 
Athanasios Psygkas eds., 2010). 
 79. See Halstuk et al., supra note 68, at 19–20. 
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simply “a negotiation between the doctrinal principles of each body of law:  
the presumption of openness that forms the basis of access law versus the 
expectation of privacy giving rise to informational privacy.”80 
2.  The First Amendment 
Any approach to providing a legal remedy for doxing victims must 
comport with the First Amendment.  Actors commonly defend themselves 
by claiming that “they are only exercising their First Amendment right to 
free speech.  And in many cases, an examination of their speech could lead 
[courts] to concur.”81  Challengers to statutory solutions for doxing could 
raise two primary arguments:  (1) that a statute is void for vagueness and 
(2) that a statute is overbroad by punishing protected speech.82 
The First Amendment rests on the underlying principle that “the 
government may not prohibit the expression of an idea simply because 
society finds the idea itself offensive or disagreeable.”83  In addition to 
protecting spoken and written communication, the First Amendment 
protects “expressive conduct so long as that conduct ‘convey[s] a 
particularized message’ and is likely to be understood in the surrounding 
circumstances.”84  However, “the [First] Amendment has no application 
when what is restricted is not protected speech.”85  This subsection explores 
protected speech and exceptions to First Amendment doctrine that remove 
certain categories of speech and expressive conduct from constitutional 
protection. 
a.  Background 
The First Amendment broadly protects communication.  “[S]o long as the 
means are peaceful, the communication need not meet standards of 
acceptability.”86  Notions of “acceptability” encompass speech that is 
 
 80. Charles N. Davis & David Cuillier, Introduction to TRANSPARENCY 2.0:  DIGITAL 
DATA AND PRIVACY IN A WIRED WORLD, supra note 68, at vii, vii. 
 81. Michael J. Prout, Assistant Dir. for Judicial Sec., U.S. Marshals Serv., Written 
Statement Presented to the United States Sentencing Commission Public Hearing on the 
Court Security Improvement Act of 2007 (Mar. 17, 2009), http://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/ 
files/pdf/amendment-process/public-hearings-and-meetings/20090317/Prout_testimony.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/6E55-2H4T]. 
 82. Leong & Morando, supra note 34, at 132. 
 83. Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 414 (1989) (collecting cases); see also Hustler 
Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 55 (1988) (rejecting an outrageousness standard for 
speech because it “runs afoul of our longstanding refusal to allow damages to be awarded 
because the speech in question may have an adverse emotional impact on the audience”); 
Members of the City Council v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 804 (1984); Bolger v. 
Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 65, 72 (1983); Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 462–
463 (1980); FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 745–46 (1978) (“[I]t is a central tenet of 
the First Amendment that the government must remain neutral in the marketplace of ideas.”); 
Young v. Am. Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 63–65, 67–68 (1976). 
 84. Kaahumanu v. Hawaii, 682 F.3d 789, 798 (9th Cir. 2012) (quoting Spence v. 
Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 409–11 (1974) (per curiam)). 
 85. Nev. Comm’n on Ethics v. Carrigan, 564 U.S. 117, 121 (2011). 
 86. Org. for a Better Austin v. Keefe, 402 U.S. 415, 419 (1971). 
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vulgar, offensive, and disagreeable.87  For example, “[s]exual expression 
which is indecent but not obscene is protected by the First Amendment.”88  
Of course, broadly protecting vulgar and indecent speech may, to some, 
create a world filled with “verbal tumult, discord, and even offensive 
utterance.”89  But this characterization represents a “necessary side effect[] 
of the broader enduring values which the process of open debate permits us 
to achieve.  That the air may at times seem filled with verbal cacophony is, 
in this sense not a sign of weakness but of strength.”90 
These broad protections are essential to prevent “empower[ing] a 
majority to silence dissidents simply as a matter of personal 
predilections.”91  Moreover, “the fact that society may find speech 
offensive is not a sufficient reason for suppressing it.  If it is the speaker’s 
opinion that gives offense, that consequence is a reason for according it 
constitutional protection.”92  In addition, First Amendment protection 
extends beyond traditional speech to encompass expressive conduct93 and 
speech via the Internet.94 
b.  The “True Threat” Exception 
The First Amendment is not an absolute bar to regulating speech.  
Certain categories of expression are either “not within the area of 
constitutionally protected speech”95 or the “protection of the First 
Amendment does not extend” to them.96  The question is whether certain 
types of harmful speech, such as doxing, can be proscribed without running 
afoul of the First Amendment.97  In Cohen v. California,98 the Supreme 
Court held that the ability to regulate speech depends on a showing that 
“substantial privacy interests are being invaded in an essentially intolerable 
manner.”99 
 
 87. Id. 
 88. Sable Commc’ns of Cal., Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 126 (1989) (finding that 
prohibiting obscene telephone messages was constitutional and that the denial of adult access 
to telephone messages that were indecent but not obscene far exceeded that which was 
necessary to limit access of minors to such messages and did not survive constitutional 
scrutiny). 
 89. Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 24–25 (1971). 
 90. Id. at 25. 
 91. Id. at 21 (reversing a state disturbing the peace conviction for a man who wore a 
jacket in court that said “fuck the draft”). 
 92. FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 745 (1978). 
 93. See, e.g., Cohen, 403 U.S. at 18. 
 94. See, e.g., Doe v. 2TheMart.com Inc., 140 F. Supp. 2d 1088, 1091–93 (W.D. Wash. 
2001). 
 95. R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 383 (1992) (quoting Roth v. United States, 
354 U.S. 476, 483 (1957)). 
 96. Id. at 383 (quoting Sable Commc’ns of Cal., Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 124 (1989); 
Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of U.S., Inc., 466 U.S. 485, 504 (1984)). 
 97. See Ronald Turner, On Free, Harmful, and Hateful Speech, 82 TENN. L. REV. 283, 
285 (2015) (discussing the interaction between harmful speech and the First Amendment). 
 98. 403 U.S. 15 (1971). 
 99. Id. at 21. 
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The First Amendment does not protect speech or writing that is as an 
integral part of criminal conduct.100  The exception most relevant to this 
Note’s effort to find a remedy for doxing is the “true threat” exception. 
True threats are not constitutionally protected by the First 
Amendment.101  They encompass statements in which the speaker means to 
communicate a serious expression of an intent to commit an act of unlawful 
violence against a particular individual or group of individuals.102  The true 
threat exception is exemplified by the idea that, “while advocating for 
violence is considered protected speech, threatening a particular individual 
with violence is not.”103  However, statements that amount to political 
hyperbole do not constitute true threats.104 
Actual intent to carry out the threat is not required for a communication 
to constitute a true threat.105  Rather, a prohibition on true threats 
“protect[s] individuals from the fear of violence” and “from the disruption 
that fear engenders,” in addition to protecting people “from the possibility 
that the threatened violence will occur.”106  True threats can also include 
intimidation, when “a speaker directs a threat to a person or group of 
persons with the intent of placing the victim in fear of bodily harm or 
death.”107  Importantly, the true threat exception extends to true threats that 
are posted on a website108 or communicated over email.109 
In deciding whether speech constitutes a true threat and is thus 
unprotected by the First Amendment, courts consider the totality of the 
circumstances, whether the threat is conditional, and the reaction of the 
listeners.110 
 
 100. Giboney v. Empire Storage & Ice Co., 336 U.S. 490, 498 (1949); see also 
Commonwealth v. Johnson, 21 N.E.3d 937, 946–47 (Mass. 2014) (“The defendants point to 
no lawful purpose of their ‘communications’ that would take them outside of the exception 
delineated in Giboney.”). 
 101. Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 359–60 (2003). 
 102. See id.; R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 388 (1992). 
 103. Marie-Helen Maras, Unprotected Speech Communicated Via Social Media:  What 
Amounts to a True Threat?, 19 J. INTERNET L. 3, 3 (2015). 
 104. Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705, 707–08 (1960) (finding that to convict for 
threatening the President’s life, the government must first prove a true threat that is not 
political hyperbole). 
 105. R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 383. 
 106. Id. at 408. 
 107. Black, 538 U.S. at 360. 
 108. See United States v. Sutcliffe, 505 F.3d 944, 960–61 (9th Cir. 2007); D.C. v. R.R., 
106 Cal. Rptr. 3d 399, 421–22 (Ct. App. 2010); see also Novartis Vaccines & Diagnostics, 
Inc. v. Stop Huntingdon Animal Cruelty USA, Inc., 50 Cal. Rptr. 3d 27, 39 (Ct. App. 2006) 
(finding that a website maintained by an organization opposed to animal testing was not 
protected under the First Amendment when the website contained information about a 
biopharmaceutical company’s employees, including home addresses, and made 
particularized threats of arson against the employees). 
 109. Abbott v. Maryland, 989 A.2d 795, 826 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2010) (finding that an 
instruction distinguishing a true threat from constitutionally protected speech must be given 
in a case involving a threat sent by email). 
 110. United States v. Fullmer, 584 F.3d 132, 154 (3d Cir. 2009).  The court found that 
news posts on an animal rights organization’s website fell within First Amendment 
protection, while posts that “disseminate the personal information of individuals employed 
by [the animal testers]” are “more problematic” and concluded that electronic 
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For example, in Elonis v. United States,111 the Supreme Court held that 
sole reliance on an objective intent standard in assessing true threats would 
not suffice.112  In interpreting a federal statute prohibiting threatening 
interstate communications that lacked a mens rea requirement, the Court 
noted that the mens rea element would be “satisfied if the defendant 
transmit[ted] a communication for the purpose of issuing a threat or with 
knowledge that the communication [would] be viewed as a threat.”113  The 
Court, however, did not decide whether a reckless mens rea would 
suffice.114 
II.  CURRENT APPROACHES TO PROVIDING A REMEDY 
FOR DOXING ARE INSUFFICIENT 
Despite the incredible injuries malicious doxing causes, few legal 
remedies for subjects exist.115  This part evaluates whether current federal 
and state statutory and common law schemes that regulate other forms of 
doxing and cyberharassment can remedy punching down doxing.  Part II.A 
discusses three current federal statutes and one proposed statute applicable 
to malicious doxing, and it analyzes the shortcomings of each.  Part II.B 
focuses on state criminal and common law approaches that capture some 
instances of cyberharassment and explains their ineffectiveness as applied 
to doxing. 
A.  Federal Statutory Approaches and Their Limitations 
This section discusses three federal statutes relevant to a search for a 
remedy for malicious doxing:  (1) section 230 of the Communications 
 
communications encouraging or describing an illegal act at a specific time, in combination 
with the other materials, constitute a true threat (in this case, going to burn down an animal 
tester’s house at a certain time). Id. at 155l; see also Torres v. Clark, No. 1:CV-10-1323, 
2012 WL 4484915, at *9 (M.D. Pa. Sept. 27, 2012), aff’d, 522 F. App’x 103 (3d Cir. 2013).  
In Torres, the court found a true threat when a prisoner wrote that if a corrections officer 
“keep[s] acting like he is above policy/law somebody is going to break his jaw is what I 
assume?!” when he knew that the officer was reading his mail. Id. at *3.  The prison’s 
dangerous environment meant that threats of violence against corrections officers must be 
taken seriously. Id. at *9.  For more on conditional threats constituting true threats, see 
United States v. Kosma, 951 F.2d 549, 554 n.8 (3d Cir. 1991). 
 111. 135 S. Ct. 2001 (2015). 
 112. See Maras, supra note 103, at 7. 
 113. Elonis v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2001, 2004 (2015) (emphasis added).  On remand, 
the Third Circuit upheld Elonis’s conviction on the grounds that that the trial court’s error 
(instructing the jury that the negligence standard was sufficient to convict) was harmless. 
United States v. Elonis, 841 F.3d 589, 601 (3d Cir. 2016).  In addition, Elonis’s “testimony 
at trial focused on [the] purpose of his Facebook posts, but never contested that he knew his 
posts would be viewed as threats.” Id. at 599.  Thus, a jury could have found that Elonis 
knew the “threatening nature” of his posts, even if the jury believed his testimony. Id. 
 114. See Elonis, 135 S. Ct. at 2004. 
 115. See ALICE E. MARWICK & ROSS MILLER, FORDHAM CTR. ON LAW & INFO. POLICY, 
ONLINE HARASSMENT, DEFAMATION, AND HATEFUL SPEECH:  A PRIMER OF THE LEGAL 
LANDSCAPE 5–6 (2014), http://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1002& 
context=clip [https://perma.cc/2ZGG-VNTC]. 
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Decency Act116 (CDA), (2) the Interstate Communications Statute,117 and 
(3) the Interstate Stalking statute.118  This section also examines a current 
bill. Further, this section addresses the weaknesses of each federal approach 
and explains why none suffices to create an appropriate remedy for doxing. 
1.  The Communications Decency Act 
Part 2.A.1.a provides an overview of the CDA, explaining the protections 
it affords to online service providers by shielding them from liability.  Part 
2.A.2.b then discusses the statute’s limitations as applied to doxing. 
a.  Overview of the Statute 
The CDA applies to malicious doxing by creating a liability shield for 
online services and thus removing a potential pathway to a doxing remedy.  
The CDA regulates obscene content on the Internet such as child 
pornography and other indecent content accessible to children.119  
However, section 230 of the CDA provides that no “provider or user of an 
interactive computer service shall be treated as the publisher or speaker of 
any information provided by another information content provider.”120  
Interactive computer service providers include, among other things, search 
engines,121 social media networks,122 hosts of online business reviews,123 
online vendors,124 and operators of sites that have message boards.125 
The CDA’s “Good Samaritan” provision limits liability for these online 
services by separating the services (e.g., Twitter) from individual speakers 
or posters who use them (e.g., Twitter users).  Using the Gamergate 
example discussed in Part I.B.1, Twitter could not be held liable under the 
CDA for a Twitter user harassing and doxing Brianna Wu. 
In addition to limiting liability for hosting constitutionally protected but 
“obscene, lewd, lascivious, filthy, excessively violent, harassing, or 
otherwise objectionable” material,126 the CDA also limits liability for 
speech that is not constitutionally protected.127  Accordingly, the CDA 
operates as a liability shield, eliminating the possibility of a remedy by 
 
 116. 47 U.S.C. § 230 (2012). 
 117. 18 U.S.C. § 875. 
 118. Id. § 2261A. 
 119. 47 U.S.C. § 223(a). 
 120. Id. § 230(c)(1). 
 121. Stayart v. Yahoo! Inc., 651 F. Supp. 2d 873, 873 (E.D. Wis. 2009). 
 122. Caraccioli v. Facebook, Inc., 167 F. Supp. 3d 1056, 1066 (N.D. Cal. 2016). 
 123. Kimzey v. Yelp Inc., No. C13-1734RAJ, 2014 WL 1805551 (W.D. Wash. May 7, 
2014). 
 124. Joseph v. Amazon.com, Inc., 46 F. Supp. 3d 1095, 1105–07 (W.D. Wash. 2014). 
 125. DiMeo v. Max, 248 F. App’x 280, 282 (3d Cir. 2007). 
 126. 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(2)(A) (2012). 
 127. See, e.g., GoDaddy.com, LLC v. Toups, 429 S.W.3d 752 (Tex. App. 2014) (finding 
that the purportedly unconstitutional nature of revenge porn images posted to websites 
without the consent of the subjects did not affect the court’s determination of whether the 
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limiting the liability of Internet service providers that host doxed content, 
regardless of whether that content is constitutionally protected. 
The CDA has two parallel goals:  (1) “to promote the free exchange of 
information and ideas over the Internet” and (2) “to encourage voluntary 
monitoring for offensive or obscene material.”128  These goals, together 
with the protections provided by the CDA, have caused online civil liberties 
advocates to hail the Act as “the most important law protecting internet 
speech.”129 
The Good Samaritan provision was also “added to the CDA as part of the 
CDA’s overall goal to ‘clean up’ the Internet from obscene materials,” and 
it limits liability for online services to “enable filtering or blocking . . . to 
spur the advancement of content filtering technologies.”130  An early 
decision addressing the provision found that an “important purpose of § 230 
was to encourage service providers to self-regulate the dissemination of 
offensive material over their services,” thereby minimizing the necessity of 
state regulation of Internet speech.131 
b.  Limitations of the Statute as Applied to Doxing 
Because of section 230, applying the CDA to punching down doxing 
would shield an entire class of possible defendants—service providers—
from liability for doxing.  In applying the CDA, “[c]ourts have roundly 
immunized site operators from liability even though they knew or should 
have known that user-generated content contained defamation, privacy 
invasions, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and civil rights 
violations.”132  The immunity provides “little incentive for [services] to 
self-regulate the appropriateness of the content posted there, leaving sites as 
blank canvases readily available for the actual parties to directly furnish 
inappropriate material online.”133 
For example, in Chicago Lawyers’ Committee for Civil Rights Under 
Law, Inc. v. Craigslist, Inc.,134 the Seventh Circuit found Craigslist immune 
from liability under the CDA for users’ discriminatory housing 
advertisements, which violated the Fair Housing Act.135  Thus, the CDA 
 
 128. Barnes v. Yahoo!, Inc., 570 F.3d 1096, 1099–100 (9th Cir. 2009) (quoting Carafano 
v. Metrosplash.com, Inc., 339 F.3d 1119, 1122 (9th Cir. 2003)). 
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 131. Zeran v. Am. Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327, 331 (4th Cir. 1997). 
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limits the remedies available to doxing subjects and leaves them without 
redress for their injuries.136 
Scholars have proposed various amendments to the CDA.137  One 
proposal calls for a take-down provision that “would work much like the 
safe harbor under section 512 of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act 
(‘DMCA’), which protects [services] who inadvertently host materials that 
infringe intellectual property rights.”138  This proposal would require that 
services take down offensive content once they are notified—that content 
could include doxes.  Congress could assign the Federal Communications 
Commission to create guidelines for companies to help determine which 
types of communications should be taken down.139 
Another proposal would remove the safe harbor provision for sites that 
“encourage cyber stalking or nonconsensual pornography and make money 
from its removal or that principally host cyber stalking or nonconsensual 
pornography.”140  Yet another would create a unique cause of action for 
injunctive relief available to subjects whose personal information is posted 
online.141  In Spain, citizens can sue to have sensitive information 
pertaining to them removed from the Internet under the Spanish Data 
Protection Authority.142  This strategy could be applied to doxing.  
However, this so-called “right to be forgotten” in the European Union 
applies only when information is “inaccurate, inadequate, irrelevant, or 
excessive,” and the right is balanced against fundamental rights like the 
freedom of expression.143  Therefore, this carve out, if included, might not 
capture doxing after all.  In addition, an amendment to section 230’s safe 
harbor provision would need to cover actions outside of defamation, or else 
doxing could not be addressed. 
2.  The Interstate Communications Statute 
Part II.A.2.a. provides an overview of the Interstate Communications 
Statute, 18 U.S.C. § 875.  Part II.A.2.b discusses limitations of the statute as 
applied to doxing and provides reasons why it fails to serve as an effective 
solution. 
 
 136. See Alison Virginia King, Constitutionality of Cyberbullying Laws:  Keeping the 
Online Playground Safe for Both Teens and Free Speech, 63 VAND. L. REV. 845, 878 (2010). 
 137. See, e.g., JOEL REIDENBERG ET AL., FORDHAM CTR. ON LAW & INFO. POLICY, SECTION 
230 OF THE COMMUNICATIONS DECENCY ACT:  A SURVEY OF THE LEGAL LITERATURE AND 
REFORM PROPOSALS 47–52 (2012), https://www.fordham.edu/download/downloads/id/1825/ 
clip_section_230_of_the_communications_decency_act_report.pdf [https://perma.cc/TW4A-
HAFG]. 
 138. See King, supra note 136, at 878 & n.209. 
 139. Id. at 878. 
 140. See CITRON, supra note 16, at 177. 
 141. Konstantinos K. Stylianou, Hasta La Vista Privacy, or How Technology Terminated 
Privacy, in PERSONAL DATA PRIVACY AND PROTECTION IN A SURVEILLANCE ERA:  
TECHNOLOGIES AND PRACTICES, supra note 78, at 44, 51. 
 142. Id. 
 143. EUROPEAN COMM’N, FACTSHEET ON THE “RIGHT TO BE FORGOTTEN” RULING (C-
131/12) (2014), http://ec.europa.eu/justice/data-protection/files/factsheets/factsheet_data_ 
protection_en.pdf [https://perma.cc/BJ6X-PVMB]. 
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a.  Overview of the Statute 
The Interstate Communications Statute—specifically § 875(c)—
criminalizes the Internet transmission144 of “any communication containing 
any threat to kidnap any person or any threat to injure the person of 
another.”145  Federal prosecutors could use § 875(c) to prosecute actors who 
dox in combination with administering threats.  Indeed, this statute could 
apply to Gamergate actors who harassed, threatened, and doxed Wu and 
others. 
Under § 875(c), the threatened party need not actually receive the 
threat.146  In addition, this statute does not require the threatener to have 
actually intended to carry out the threat if “the threat on its face and in the 
circumstances in which it is made is so unequivocal, unconditional, 
immediate and specific as to the person threatened, as to convey a gravity of 
purpose and imminent prospect of execution.”147  In Elonis, the Supreme 
Court held that a purposeful or knowing mens rea is sufficient to establish 
culpability under § 875(c); however, the Court left it to the lower courts to 
determine whether recklessness would also suffice.148 
b.  Shortcomings of the Interstate Communications Statute 
While § 875(c) comes close to covering some instances of doxing, it fails 
to provide a completely effective solution for three reasons.  First, the 
actions the actor undertakes must constitute a threat to kidnap or injure the 
subject.149  If the speech is a “true threat,” it falls under the true threat 
exception to the First Amendment and thus can be regulated.150  In many 
instances of doxing, an actor “may never convey an explicit threat to kidnap 
or injure his or her victim, yet the victim could still have good reason to be 
terrified.”151  Thus, it is unlikely that a dox will contain a specific, explicit 
threat.  However, courts’ interpretations of a similar statute can shed some 
light on how § 875 could best be construed to capture malicious doxing, 
even when it is not accompanied by an additional specific threat.  For 
 
 144. 18 U.S.C. § 875(c) (2012).  The statute’s language criminalizes interstate 
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example, the Freedom of Access to Clinic Entrances Act (FACE) 
criminalizes threats made to providers of reproductive health services.152  In 
Planned Parenthood v. American Coalition of Life Activists,153 the Ninth 
Circuit held that the doxing of the names and addresses of health providers 
on “wanted”-style posters constituted a true threat without an additional, 
specific threat of violence.154  The court found that the defendant “was 
aware that a ‘wanted’-type poster would likely be interpreted as a serious 
threat of death or bodily harm by a doctor in the reproductive health 
services community who was identified on one, given the previous pattern 
of ‘WANTED’ posters identifying a specific physician followed by that 
physician’s murder.”155 
Accordingly, one effective approach to doxing could be to find that a dox 
of names and addresses online is a true threat without an additional, specific 
threat of violence.  However, the Planned Parenthood Court’s approach 
required the homicide of another doctor to happen before finding a true 
threat.156  This logic lends weight to Gamergate victim Zoe Quinn’s fears 
“that what it’s going to take to stop [the doxing and harassment of victims 
without a remedy] is the death of one of the women who’s been 
targeted.”157 
The second drawback of § 875(c) is the possibility that lower federal 
courts will employ the Supreme Court’s “purposeful or knowing mens rea” 
standard in Elonis to determine true threats under the statute without also 
adopting the recklessness standard, making it harder to prosecute threats.158  
The first standard—purposefulness—requires “a subjective intent to 
threaten,” which is similar to regular criminal intent.159  Under the Model 
Penal Code, this standard requires proof that a defendant “consciously 
wants to cause a certain result.”160  “At trial, the prosecution would rely on 
statements made by the defendant to cohorts, and assembling different 
pieces of evidence, in order to convince the fact finder that the defendant 
possessed specific intent” to threaten the subject.161 
The second standard—knowledge—requires showing the defendant’s 
knowledge that the communication would be viewed as a threat.162  The 
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Model Penal Code’s definition of “knowingly” requires proof that a 
defendant “is practically certain that his conduct will cause [the intended] 
result.”163  These higher standards could risk undercriminalizing 
threatening communications—a dangerous prospect when the nature of 
social media exacerbates the dangers inherent in true threats.164 
However, a recklessness standard would provide greater protection for 
doxing subjects while still comporting with the true threat doctrine.165  
Recklessness contemplates the subject’s objective interpretation of the 
threat along with the subjective intent of the actor.  This is critical because 
the National Network to End Domestic Violence argues that “victims are 
often the best assessors of the risk that the threats of violence they face will 
be carried out.”166  The objective context of a message would help 
prosecutors and law enforcement to understand the meaning and 
implications of that message.167 
The third issue with § 875(c) is that many law enforcement officers are 
simply unaware that the statute exists and could be used to prosecute 
doxing.168  In fact, one subject found that seeking legal recourse “only 
continually put [her] in harm’s way.”169  For example, after she was doxed, 
Brianna Wu called the police.170  The FBI assigned a special agent to her 
case, which was then reassigned to the state attorney general’s office, which 
has not yet pursued charges.171  Because of her high-profile case, Wu 
believes that law enforcement “[has] every reason to want to solve this 
crime, but at the same time nothing has happened, even giving them as 
much information as [she] ha[s].”172  Wu and her husband explained to the 
FBI agent that they “feel like [they] are sending emails into the void” and 
that “[they] do not have any faith that the FBI is interested in helping [their] 
family.”173  Accordingly, any adequate remedy for doxing will provide for 
the training of law enforcement officers so that they can better help doxing 
victims who are in danger. 
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3.  The Interstate Stalking Statute 
Part II.A.3.a. provides an overview of the Interstate Stalking Statute, 18 
U.S.C. § 2261A, including a brief discussion of its 2013 amendment.  Part 
II.A.3.b further discusses the limitations of the Interstate Stalking Statute as 
applied to doxing and law enforcement’s unwillingness to enforce the 
statute. 
a.  Overview of the Statute 
Section 2261A(2) of the Interstate Stalking Statute prohibits the use of 
“any interactive computer service” in a “course of conduct” that places a 
person in reasonable fear of death or serious bodily injury or “causes 
substantial emotional distress to a person.”174  Whether this statute could be 
used to prosecute malicious doxing depends on whether the dox constitutes 
a “course of conduct.”  For example, to prosecute the Gamergate actor 
under the statute in Brianna Wu’s case, the actor’s tweets must constitute a 
“course of conduct.”  The statute requires “intent to kill, injure, harass, or 
place under surveillance with intent to kill, injure, harass, or intimidate 
another person.”175 
Congress enacted the statute in 1996 as part of the Violence Against 
Women Act (VAWA), primarily to combat in-person stalking resulting in 
physical harm to victims.176  However, “[w]ith the proliferation of cheap 
technology that allows instantaneous tracking and monitoring of victims, 
the frequency of cyberstalking has risen dramatically.”177  Accordingly, 
Congress amended VAWA in 2013 to include explicit provisions for 
cyberstalking.178 
A “course of conduct” is an element of any offense under § 2261A(2) 
and means “a pattern of conduct composed of two or more acts.”179  In 
2015, the U.S. District Court for the District of Delaware convicted three 
defendants on charges of cyberstalking that resulted in a death.180  They 
“conducted a campaign to surveil and harass” the victim, Christine Belford, 
one of the defendants’ ex-wife.181  Over four years, the defendants “posted 
accusations against the victim online, sent accusations against Belford to 
the school that one of the children attended and to Belford’s church, and 
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solicited their friends’ assistance in visiting Belford’s home to monitor 
Belford.”182 
This case is the first in which defendants “were convicted of 
cyberstalking resulting in [a] death.”183  It also demonstrates the high bar 
necessary to prove a “course of conduct” under the statute. 
b.  Limitations to the Statute’s Application to Doxing 
The Interstate Stalking Statute could be an effective tool to combat some 
instances of doxing, but it is underinclusive because of its “course of 
conduct” requirement.  Additionally, this statute faces the same resource 
limitation problems as the Interstate Communications Statute. 
Section 2261A(2) applies where an actor uses a computer within a 
“course of conduct” that places a person in reasonable fear of death or 
serious bodily harm or “causes, attempts to cause, or would be reasonably 
expected to cause substantial emotional distress to a person.”184  
Limitations to this statute’s application to doxing exist because actors often 
work in concert with other actors in a cybermob.185  Countless threads work 
together with “one poster starting the abuse and others piling on.”186  If 
each actor “was responsible for only one or two isolated posts,” no single 
person could likely be held responsible for the “course of conduct” under 
§ 2261A(2).187 
According to Professor Danielle Keats Citron, the Interstate Stalking 
Statute is “very helpful” when federal law enforcement agencies enforce 
it.188  However, she argues that officers often say, “We’re in the business of 
worrying about murder and terrorism, we don’t enforce cyberstalking 
laws.”189  Meanwhile, officers spend the majority of their time and 
resources investigating drug crimes and larceny, so it is untrue that federal 
law enforcement is too busy investigating terrorism and murder—“[t]he 
statistics belie that.”190  Indeed, federal prosecutors seldom apply the statute 
to cyberharassment cases.191  Whereas prosecutors used § 2261A ten times 
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from 2010 to 2013,192 an estimated 3.3 million people age eighteen or older 
were victims of stalking in a single year.193 
4.  Proposed Legislation 
U.S. Representative Katherine Clark, who represents the district where 
Brianna Wu and other doxing subjects live, has proposed several pieces of 
legislation that would provide some relief to doxing victims.  In June 2015, 
Representative Clark proposed the Prioritizing Online Threat Enforcement 
Act of 2015, which calls upon the U.S. Attorney General to ensure that at 
least ten additional FBI agents support the Criminal Division of the 
Department of Justice in the investigation and coordination of cybercrimes 
against individuals.194  In March 2016, Representative Clark introduced the 
Cybercrime Enforcement Training Assistance Act of 2016, directing the 
Department of Justice to award grants to state and local governments to 
prevent, enforce, and prosecute cybercrimes against individuals.195 
Both bills would provide important support to doxing subjects.  The first 
would address some of the systematic bars to prosecution under federal 
statutes by assigning more officers to investigate cybercrimes.  The second 
would alleviate some of the concerns addressed in Part II.B by making 
officers aware of doxing by increasing training at the state and local 
level.196 
The House of Representatives referred the Cybercrime Enforcement 
Training Assistance Act to the House Committee on the Judiciary and then 
to the Subcommittee on Crime, Terrorism, Homeland Security, and 
Investigations.197  The Prioritizing Online Threat Enforcement Act 
followed the same path to committee as its successor.198  It does not have 
any Republican supporters and is not expected to make it past the 
subcommittee stage.199 
B.  State Approaches and Their Limitations 
This section discusses different ways state legislatures have addressed 
cyberharassment and how, if at all, these approaches reach doxing.  Part 
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II.B.1 covers criminal approaches, and Part II.B.2 covers state common law 
doctrines that could provide relief to doxing subjects. 
1.  Criminal:  Cyberstalking and Criminal Harassment 
Most states, to some extent, have criminalized cyberstalking or have 
applied criminal harassment statutes to online activity.200  This subsection 
discusses state criminal laws that regulate cyberstalking and further 
discusses the shortcomings with this approach. 
a.  Overview of State Criminal Statutes Regulating Doxing 
Data on the enforcement of cyberstalking and harassment statutes are 
hard to find because most states do not collect such data.201  Anecdotal 
evidence from several states sheds some light on the strengths of state 
criminal law as an effective remedy for doxing. 
For example, in Commonwealth v. Johnson,202 two neighbors were in a 
dispute over a property.203  Out of revenge, the defendant posted a false 
Craigslist ad for free golf carts with the name, address, and phone number 
of his neighbor, constituting an instance of punching down doxing.204  
Thirty to forty people showed up at the subject’s home.205  Then the 
defendant posted a false ad for an inexpensive motorcycle with a request to 
call the neighbor’s cell phone after 10:00 p.m.206  The calls continued for 
months, up to twenty calls every ten minutes.207 
Massachusetts charged the defendant with conspiracy and criminal 
harassment.208  The Massachusetts Supreme Court found that the criminal 
harassment statute did not proscribe free speech, because it is “directed at a 
course of conduct, rather than speech, ‘and the conduct it proscribes is not 
necessarily associated with speech.’”209  The statute specifically 
criminalizes “a knowing pattern of conduct . . . or series of acts . . . directed 
at a specific person, which seriously alarms that person and would cause a 
reasonable person to suffer substantial emotional distress.”210 
When a statute “proscribes harassing and intimidating conduct, the 
statute is not facially invalid under the First Amendment.”211  In addition, a 
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statute can contain adequate safeguards to prevent its application to 
protected speech.212 
Moreover, the court found that “[t]he defendants cannot launder their 
harassment of the [victims] through the Internet to escape liability.”213  The 
Craigslist posts were not protected because they were “the equivalent of the 
defendants recruiting others to harass the victims and the victims alone.”214  
In all, the Massachusetts criminal harassment statute provided an effective 
remedy for a specific doxing subject. 
Several other states have effective criminal laws that can be used to 
prosecute doxing.  Maryland Criminal Code section 3-803 prohibits an 
intentional, malicious course of conduct that constitutes harassment, as long 
as the actor has received a reasonable warning or request to stop by or on 
behalf of the subject.215 
In addition, Utah Representative David E. Lifferth has introduced House 
Bill 225, which modifies the existing criminal code to include cybercrimes 
such as doxing, swatting, and denial of service attacks.216  The doxing 
provision of House Bill 225 prohibits the publication of personal 
identifying information, including name and home address.217  If 
constitutional, this bill is an example of a state criminal statute that would 
provide specific support to doxing subjects. 
b.  Limitations on the State’s Statutory Approach 
The overarching problem facing the state statutory approach is the lack of 
police awareness, training, care, and resources to help enforce and protect 
because “even the most effectively drafted stalking and harassment laws 
cannot do much if they are not enforced.”218  Specifically, victims report 
that officers tend to lack awareness of the problems of cyberharassment and 
doxing.219  When one journalist reported an online rape threat to police, the 
responding officer asked her, “Why would anyone bother to do something 
like that?” and declined to file a report.220  “That [her] stalker had said that 
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he lived in [her] state, and had plans to seek [her] out at home, was 
dismissed as just another online ruse.”221 
The practical implications of protecting a subject from an online threat 
also indicate the difficulty that law enforcement officers face in providing 
relief.  Many harassers are (at least initially) anonymous, and IP addresses 
can be difficult to trace.  As a result, officers sometimes report that they 
believe they cannot offer assistance if the actor is outside the state or 
locality.222  Another journalist who was doxed received an onslaught of 
harassing messages and threats followed by an inundation of takeout orders 
sent to her old apartment.223  When she went to the police to file a report, 
the officer asked her, “[D]o we know where they physically are?  We need 
physical locations” and declined to file a report.224  Ultimately, “[t]he 
advice that police give to victims is to stay offline.”225 
The difficulty of pinpointing the location of an actor highlights the 
importance of protecting doxing subjects.  While the actor’s location may 
be unknown, the location of the threatened attack becomes clear the 
moment the actor doxes the subject. 
Additional limitations apply to specific state statutes.  For example, in 
Massachusetts, the efficacy of the criminal harassment statute is limited by 
the definition of a “course of conduct.”226  If an actor doxes a subject once, 
causing extreme emotional distress, this action most likely would not 
constitute a “course of conduct” and thus cannot be prosecuted under the 
state criminal harassment statute.  Further, many individual actors acting 
alone would not fall within the meaning of “course of conduct” under a 
Massachusetts-like statute.227  Another issue is that the proscribed activity 
is conduct, not language.  In Maryland, the criminal harassment statute 
requires the victim to intercede and provide a “reasonable warning” to the 
harasser.228 
More generally, state laws punish “credible threats of violence.”229  Only 
a few states “prohibit harassment communicated directly or indirectly, on- 
or offline.”230  Accordingly, only a few state statutes currently reach 
subjects who are bullied into silence where those subjects do not feel 
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“tangible, sustained, and immediate fear” of an “unequivocal, 
unconditional, and specific” threat.231  If any of these exacting elements is 
not met in a given scenario, current state criminal law cannot provide a 
remedy for that doxing subject.  Accordingly, current state criminal 
approaches to doxing fall short of providing an effective legal remedy. 
2.  Common Law:  Defamation, Harassment, and IIED 
Common law approaches can provide a remedy for doxing.  This 
subsection briefly discusses three different common law torts that can apply 
to doxing:  defamation, harassment, and intentional infliction of emotional 
distress (IIED). 
a.  Overview of Common Law Approaches 
Tort law can cover some instances of doxing.  In many ways it is an 
appealing approach because of its “flexible dynamic structure,” which 
“permit[s] technological innovation and change while controlling 
undesirable behavior.”232  Culture and time influence societal expectations 
and shared beliefs on privacy standards, so the judiciary’s ability to make 
case-by-case determinations that incorporate common beliefs is critical to 
finding an effective solution for malicious doxing.233 
Some states recognize a cause of action for defamation that could apply 
to doxing.234  In addition, harassment claims can provide some redress for 
doxing subjects,235 as can the tort of intentionally or recklessly causing 
severe emotional distress with extreme and outrageous conduct.  This 
standard sets a high bar for conduct, but “[h]umiliating, threatening, and 
persistent online cruelty amounts to ‘extreme and outrageous’ activity 
because it falls outside the norms of decency.”236 
b.  Limitations to Common Law Approaches 
The overarching issue with the state common law approach is that it puts 
the burden of enforcement on the doxing subject.  The cost of a lawsuit 
against a doxing actor is estimated at $10,000 to $60,000 and 500 hours of 
labor.237  The subject would bear the entirety of these costs. 
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Additional drawbacks include cause of action, scope, and high standards.  
For example, defamation does not capture instances of doxing when the 
information published is true, like a home address.  In fact, even “[w]hen 
people are lied about, they typically expect that some legal recourse will be 
available, but are often sorely disappointed.”238 
In addition, the “extreme and outrageous conduct” standard required for a 
prima facie case of IIED is a high standard that restricts recovery for 
extreme emotional distress more than recovery for physical harm.239  A 
one-time tweet of a subject’s contact information likely would not rise to 
the high bar set in IIED.  For these reasons, the state common law approach 
is an imperfect remedy for doxing subjects. 
III.  A BLENDED SOLUTION:  PROPOSING A REMEDY WITH STATE AND 
FEDERAL STATUTORY ELEMENTS 
As discussed in Part II, neither state nor federal law provides a consistent 
approach to deal with doxing, resulting in severe harm to doxing 
subjects.240  While many types of online harassment—such as 
impersonation, revenge pornography, and defamation—cause harm, doxing 
puts victims in critical, physical danger.  Doxing is a tool that moves purely 
online harassment into the physical realm.241  Even though doxed 
information can be publicly available, people should have the right to 
control their contact information to keep themselves free from harassment, 
threats, and living in fear.242  In addition, the Internet provides a platform to 
amplify public information and to weaponize it.243  Accordingly, the best 
solution to the lack of a doxing remedy involves (1) the widespread 
adoption by lower federal courts of a recklessness standard for the Interstate 
Communications Statute to encourage further enforcement and (2) the 
adoption or amendment of state criminal laws criminalizing malicious 
doxing under the true threat exception to the First Amendment.  To support 
the adoption of state criminal laws, Congress should pass federal legislation 
providing funding for state and local law enforcement to train officers to 
better enforce state cyberharassment law. 
A.  Lower Federal Courts Should Adopt a Recklessness Standard 
for the Interstate Communications Statute 
As discussed in Part II, the Interstate Communications Statute can be an 
effective tool for prosecuting doxing;244 however, the statute has some 
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limitations.245  To overcome these limitations, the lower federal courts 
should adopt a recklessness standard for the statute’s mens rea.246 
The Supreme Court has made clear that speech can rise to a true threat 
through a showing that the speaker purposefully or knowingly intended to 
threaten the subject.247  However, recklessness will enable prosecutors to 
look at the objective effect of the speech and its effect on the subject.248  
Analysis of the totality of the circumstances, which a recklessness standard 
would provide, will give dimension to online statements that could 
otherwise be abstract and lacking in context.  For such a test to truly 
encompass all circumstances, it must consider the threat from a reasonable 
person in the victim’s position. 
In addition, the aggregate nature of communications on interactive 
websites like Twitter make threats inherently riskier, which should 
encourage a lower standard.  This is important because all people should 
have the right to free expression online, not just malicious actors.249  
Freedom of expression should “extend[] to those who are too afraid to 
participate in online activities and debates because of fear of harassment.  
Their right to express themselves must be protected too.”250 
More specifically, when an actor chooses to publish a subject’s home 
address, she consciously disregards a substantial chance that her words will 
be perceived as a threat because the publication of the home address moves 
the harassment from the digital world into the real world, where physical 
violence can take place.251  The act approaches a per se true threat because 
it creates particularity by specifying a location of harm.  Of course, an 
address dox alone, without more, would likely not constitute a true threat.  
It must be accompanied by a pattern of conduct that includes harassment 
and particularized threats.  Under this solution, the harassment and dox of 
Brianna Wu would constitute a true threat and be actionable.252  
Accordingly, the recklessness standard will help to make § 875(c) more 
broadly applicable to doxing cases. 
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B.  States Should Criminalize the Malicious Publication 
of Personal Information 
In addition to strengthening the application of existing federal statutes, a 
comprehensive approach to providing a remedy for malicious doxing would 
also include new or amended state criminal legislation.  State legislation 
would work in concert with the federal Interstate Stalking and Interstate 
Communications Statutes because it can be more narrowly tailored.  These 
state laws will fill gaps that cannot be covered by the federal legislation. 
It is well established that “‘the basic principles of freedom of speech and 
the press, like the First Amendment’s command, do not vary’ when a new 
and different medium for communication appears.”253  Even so, remedies 
are possible under established exceptions to the First Amendment because 
“developments in technology influence the appropriate interpretation of 
constitutional rights.”254  Accordingly, the First Amendment “need not be 
intentionally blind to the way the Internet has changed the way we interact 
with one another.”255  New or amended legislation does not need to be 
restricted to a course of conduct because, as argued in Part III.A, doxes of a 
person’s home address come close to approximating a true threat on their 
own and thus can be regulated.256 
State criminalization of doxing is also a more practical solution because 
subjects call 911 and hope for immediate police intervention when they are 
threatened.  Police, however, have no clear guidelines on how to respond to 
cybersecurity issues and thus fail to help doxing subjects.  Having succinct 
state laws will enable officers to meet the needs of doxed citizens the 
moment harassment is reported. 
State criminal laws also provide maximum flexibility without burdening 
doxing subjects.  They are preferable over a common law remedy because 
criminal laws remove the procedural and practical bars to relief.257  
Criminal statutes serve as a “route to deterrence” that does not “put all the 
burden on victims.”258 
States can look to proposed federal legislation for guidance on how to 
best craft a criminal doxing statute.259  At the federal level, other 
comparable solutions include swatting hoaxes legislation, the Clark bill,260 
and the Speier revenge porn bill.261  These three legislative solutions 
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provide direction to law enforcement to increase funding and training 
relating to lesser-known types of online harassment.  These solutions are 
excellent models for how states should attempt to legislate against home 
address doxes. 
Trained, knowledgeable officers can help to overcome threats and make 
doxing subjects feel safe.  To assist states with the enforcement of 
malicious doxing statutes, Congress should support Representative Clark’s 
law enforcement training bill, providing resources to state and local police 
departments and prosecutors’ offices to ensure that states have the funding 
they need to enforce newly created or amended laws.262 
CONCLUSION 
The malicious publication of personal information is an online 
harassment tool that causes unique and serious real-world harms.  While the 
law currently provides effective remedies for subjects who are doxed for 
political purposes, current federal and state approaches do not provide a 
consistent, effective legal remedy for purely malicious doxing.  Lower 
federal courts should adopt a recklessness standard for interpreting the 
interstate communications statute to facilitate enforcement of malicious 
doxing cases.  In addition, states should create criminal laws that offer 
maximum flexibility and train officers to assist and protect doxing subjects.  
The increasing use and newsworthiness of malicious doxing as a tool to 
harass and silence indicates that the time has come to ensure protections are 
in place so that people can use the Internet without fear of physical 
violence. 
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